Recently there was proposed a novel public key cryptosystem [17] based on non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders with quadratic decryption time. This scheme was later on called NICE for New Ideal Coset Encryption [6] . First implementations show that the decryption is as efficient as RSA-encryption with e = 2 16 + 1. It was an open question whether it is possible to construct comparably efficient signature schemes based on non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. The major drawbacks of the ElGamal-type [7] and RSA/Rabin-type signature schemes [8] proposed so far are the slow signature generation and the very inefficient system setup, which involves the computation of the class number h(∆1) of the maximal order with a subexponential time algorithm. To avoid this tedious computation it was proposed to use totally non-maximal orders, where h(∆1) = 1, to set up DSA analogues. Very recently however it was shown in [10] , that the discrete logarithm problem in this case can be reduced to finite fields and hence there seems to be no advantage in using DSA analogues based on totally non-maximal orders.
Introduction
Since nobody can guarantee that currently used cryptosystems based on the difficulty of factoring or the computation of discrete logarithms in some group stay secure forever it is important to consider different primitives and groups for the construction of cryptosystems. On the other hand the continously growing popularity of cryptosystems based on elliptic curves emphasize that certain mathematical structures seem to allow more efficient implementation for the same conjectured level of security.
Another recently proposed mathematical structure which allows the construction of very efficient cryptosystems are non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. For a recent survey of cryptosystems based on quadratic orders we refer to the forthcoming [11] . For example it was shown in [17] that there is a public key cryptosystem which has quadratic decryption time. To our knowledge this is the only scheme having this property. First implementations show that the decryption is about as efficient as the encryption with RSA with e = 2 16 + 1. Note that this a very important feature, as the decryption often takes place in a device with limited computational power, such as a smart card. It was an open question whether there is also an efficient signature scheme based these nonmaximal imaginary quadratic orders. All currently proposed signature schemes based on this structure have different drawbacks: The signature generation of the ElGamal analogue [7] and the RSA/Rabin analogues [8] based on conventional non-maximal orders is fairly inefficient. In fact, except from the Rabin-analogue, one uses the particular structure of the non-maximal order only to set up the system. The signature generation itself has to be performed in the public nonmaximal order, which does not allow very efficient computation. For the system setup one has to compute the class number h(∆ 1 ) of the maximal order, where
200 to prevent ∆ p from being factored using the Elliptic Curve Method (ECM). The computation of h(∆ 1 ) is done with an analogue of the quadratic sieve with subexponential running time and hence is very inefficient. To avoid this computation it was proposed in [8] to use totally non-maximal orders, where h(∆ 1 ) = 1. Using the recently developed exponentiation technique [9] one is able to implement DSA analogues in these totally non-maximal orders almost as efficiently as conventional DSA in IF * p for the same conjectured level of security. However, even more recently, it was shown in [10] that discrete logarithms in the class group of totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders Cl(∆ p ) can be reduced to discrete logarithms in finite fields and hence there seems to be no advantage in using this DSA analogue.
In this work we will introduce an efficient NICE-Schnorr-type signature scheme based on non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders which solves both above problems:
At first the system-setup is very fast, because we do not have to compute the class number of the maximal order h(∆ 1 ), but only compute in (a subgroup of) the kernel of φ
−1
Cl instead, which cardinality is known in advance. This is a similar situation as for the NICE cryptosystem. As noted in [17] , the restriction to elements of the kernel does not seem to introduce any weakness as long as the conductor p is kept secret and hence our scheme is based on the difficulty of factoring
Second the signature generation of our proposed scheme is also very fast. To perform the exponentiation of a generator g of a 160 bit subgroup of order q of Ker(φ
Cl ) one can use the recently developed arithmetic [9] , which is about twenty times as fast as standard ideal arithmetic. This arithmetic allows the signer to replace the fairly inefficient ideal arithmetic in the non-maximal order by computations in ( with p about 1000 bits. Note that while it is conjectured that factoring numbers of the form rp 2 is considerably easier than factoring n = pq there is only an ECM-variant [18] known which is able to make use of this special structure and if r, p > 2 240 this method is clearly infeasible. Thus the bitlength of the modulus p in our exponentiations is only about one third of the bitlength of the modulus in the original Schnorr scheme. Hence we end up with a signature generation which is more than twice as fast as for the original Schnorr scheme [20] , which in turn is much faster than that of RSA for example.
Note that for possible Schnorr analogues working in subgroups of (Z Z/nZ Z) * for composite n, one needs to be very careful as pointed out in [14] . This issue and the entirely different situation here is discussed in Section 4.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will provide the necessary background and notations of non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders used in this work. In Section 3 we will explain the proposed signature scheme. In Section 4 we will consider the security of our scheme. In Section 5 we will introduce the novel exponentiation technique using CRT in (O ∆1 /pO ∆1 ) * and give timings of a first implementation. This will show that the signature generation of our scheme is more than twice as fast in the original Schnorr scheme, which makes our scheme very attractive for practical application.
Necessary Preliminaries and Notations of Imaginary Quadratic Orders
The basic notions of imaginary quadratic number fields may be found in [2, 3] . For a more comprehensive treatment of the relationship between maximal and non-maximal orders we refer to [4, 7, 9, 10] .
Let ∆ ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4) be a negative integer, which is not a square. The quadratic order of discriminant ∆ is defined to be
The standard representation of some α ∈ O ∆ is α = x + yω, where x, y ∈ Z Z.
We will always assume in this work that the conductor p is prime. Furthermore we will omit the subscripts to reference arbitrary (fundamental or non-fundamental) discriminants. Because Q(
we also omit the subscripts to reference the number field Q(
where Algorithms for the group operation (multiplication and reduction of ideals) can be found in [3] . The order of the class group is called the class number of O ∆ and is denoted by h(∆).
Our cryptosystem makes use of the relation between the maximal and nonmaximal orders. Any non-maximal order may be represented as
It is well known, that all O ∆p -ideals prime to the conductor are invertible. In every class there is an ideal which is prime to any given number. The algorithm FindIdealPrimeTo in [7] will compute such an ideal. If we denote the (principal) O ∆p -ideals, which are prime to p by P ∆p (p) and I ∆p (p) respectively then there is an isomorphism
Thus we may 'neglect' the ideals which are not prime to the conductor, if we are only interested in the class group Cl(∆ p ). There is an isomorphism between the group of O ∆p -ideals which are prime to p and the group of O ∆1 -ideals, which are prime to p, denoted by I ∆1 (p) respectively:
The inverse of this map is
Proof : See [4, Proposition 7.20, page 144] . ✷ Thus we are able to switch to and from the maximal order. The algorithms GoToMaxOrder(a, p) to compute ϕ −1 and GoToNonMaxOrder(A, p) to compute ϕ respectively may be found in [7] .
It is important to note that the isomorphism ϕ is between the ideal groups I ∆1 (p) and I ∆p (p) and not the class groups.
If, for A, B ∈ I ∆1 (p) we have A ∼ B, it is not necessarily true that ϕ(A) ∼ ϕ(B).
On the other hand, equivalence does hold under ϕ −1 . More precisely we have the following:
Proof: This immediately follows from the short exact sequence:
(see [16, Theorem 12.9 
, p. 82]). ✷
In the following we will study the kernel Ker(φ
−1
Cl ) of the above map φ
−1 Cl
and hence the relation between a class in the maximal order and the associated classes in the non-maximal order in more detail. We start with yet another interpretation of the class group Cl(∆ p ). 
Proposition 3. Let O ∆p be an order of conductor p in a quadratic field. Then there are natural isomorphisms
The next result explains the relation between Ker(φ
Proof: This is shown in the more comprehensive proof of Theorem 7.24 in [4] (page 147). ✷ Thus one may reduce the arithmetic in Ker(φ
* . This is precisely what was proposed in [9] . Using the naive "generator-arithmetic" as introduced there one is able to perform an exponentiation in Ker(φ
−1
Cl ) about twenty times as fast as by using standard ideal arithmetic. In Section 5 we will show that one can even do much better by applying the CRT in (O ∆1 /pO ∆1 ) * .
Finally, we will give the exact relationship between the class numbers h(∆ 1 ) and h(∆ p ). 
The New Signature Scheme
In this section we will show how one can set up a NICE-Schnorr-type signature scheme using Ker(φ until g = ρ p (ϕ(αO ∆1 )) = O ∆1 using the algorithm Gen-Exp from [9] or the more efficient CRT variant introduced in Section 5. 5. Choose a random integer a < q and compute the public key a = ρ p (g a ).
6. The secret key of Alice is the triple x, y, a.
Note that Alice will keep secret p, q, r, x, y, a and only publishes ∆ p , g, a. Now the signature generation and verification procedure is analogous to the original Schnorr-scheme [20] . The only difference is that Alice may speed up the signature generation process by using the knowledge of α = x + yω and performing the computation in (O ∆1 /pO ∆1 ) * instead of using the fairly inefficient ideal arithmetic.
More precisely Alice performs the following steps to sign a message m ∈ Z Z:
Choose a random integer 1 < k < q and compute k =Gen-CRT(x, y, p, k),
where the algorithm Gen-CRT() is given in Section 5. 2. Compute e = h(m||k) and s ≡ ae + k mod q.
Alice's signature for m is the pair (e, s).
The verification is completely analogous to the original scheme [20] using standard ideal arithmetic (see e.g. [3] ) in the non-maximal order:
and e = h(m||v).
The signature is valid if and only if e = e.
It is clear that the verification works if the signature was generated by Alice,
While the procedures for signature generation and verification are completely analogous to the original scheme there is a big difference in the overall scheme which has to be considered more closely. Our scheme is (beside other difficulties which are explained below) based on the intractability of factoring ∆ p . In step 2. the s-part of of the signature is unique modulo q, which is kept secret. Thus by collecting a lot of signatures with different s's one may hope to learn the magnitude of q, which divides p − 1. This information might be useful to factor ∆ p . In the next section however we will show that such an attack is no real threat.
Security Issues of the Proposed Scheme
In this section we will discuss the security and appropriate parameter sizes of our proposed scheme. As it relies on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in (a subgroup of) the kernel of φ
−1
Cl we will start with relating this problem to more conventional problems such as factoring and computing logarithms in finite fields.
The following result shows that "in practice" the DL-problem in Ker(φ
Cl ) is "about as hard" as factoring ∆ p . Cl ) the smallest possible exponent e. It is easy to see that this oracle can be used to determine |Ker(φ
Theorem 1. With notations as in the previous

−1
Cl )| = p ± 1, where the '+' occurs for our concrete setup. This is done by choosing some e and handing over g e to the oracle. Then e > |Ker(φ
Cl )| implies that e > e and then e −e = k|Ker(φ
Cl )| for some integer k. If we repeat this step multiple times then the gcd of the obtained differences will be |Ker(φ
Cl )| with high probability. The reduction 2. is shown in [10] . ✷ Note that as in the original Schnorr-setup our scheme operates in a subgroup of the kernel. While it is not rigorously proven it is commonly assumed that the DL-problem in the subgroup is indeed as hard as the "full" DL-problem. Thus the assumption that the DL-problem in a subgroup of Ker(φ
Cl ) is computational equivalent to the DL-problem in Ker(φ
Cl ) itself is denoted by (subgroup-DL). If we furthermore assume that our hash function acts like a random oracle [1] , denoted by (ROM), then it is easy to prove the following result in complete analogy to [ Thus we may combine the above results to obtain the following:
Corollary 2. Assume (ROM) and (subgroup-DL). Furthermore assume that one is able to compute discrete logarithms in IF * p , which is feasible for the proposed parameter sizes. Then forging of signatures in our NICE-Schnorr-scheme is equivalent to factoring
Thus our scheme is secure as long as we choose the parameters as follows:
Cl ) using a subexponential algorithm [12] we require ∆ p > 2 400 . -That one cannot use a generic technique to compute discrete logarithms in the subgroup of the kernel, such as Pollard's ρ-method, we require q > 2 160 . -If one is able to factor ∆ p then one can reduce the discrete logarithm problem in the kernel to the discrete logarithm problem in IF * p using the recent reduction from [10] . Thus we need to ensure that ∆ p cannot be factored. With current algorithms (NFS and optimized ECM [18] ) this should be impossible if we require ∆ p > 2 720 and p, r > 2 240 . -As we do not disclose q, where q|(p − 1), we need to take care that the knowledge of many signatures does not help to find q, and hence breaking the scheme by factoring ∆ p , easier.
In the following we will discuss the potential threat of estimating q with the knowledge of many signatures more thoroughly. We will only sketch the main ideas here.
Estimating q by the maximal value of s
It is clear that q|(p − 1) and our scheme can be easily broken if ∆ p = ∆ 1 p 2 is factored, because in this case one uses the result of [10] and is just faced with the computation of discrete logarithms in IF * p , which is possible for the proposed size of p. While it is not clear at the moment whether knowledge of q will immediately imply the knowledge of p, we will show that collecting signatures and taking care of the maximum s-value does not even help to come very close to q.
Since for all signatures (e i , s i ) it holds that s i ∈ [0, q − 1] an attacker could try to estimate q by the max i (s i ) and then to use this gained information to factor ∆ p . The following argument shows that with overwhelming probability max i (s i ) is not close enough to q.
Since h is a strong hash function we may assume that e = h(m||k) and k are not significantly correlated for randomly chosen m and k. For simplicity we assume that e and k are statistically independent. Then s ≡ ae + k mod q is uniform distributed in [0, q − 1]. Therefore, for fixed 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and for randomly chosen messages m 1 , . . . , m n and randomly chosen k 1 , . . . , k n with probability α n the inequality s i ≤ α(q − 1) holds for all i ≤ n. Thus for n m the probability that s i ≤ (1 − 1/m)q holds for all i ≤ n is approximately (1 − n/m).
If we assume that the number n of signatures is limited by 2 20 we can estimate that for all, say > 20 at most with probablity 2 20− there is an i ≤ n with s i > (1 − 2 − )q. On the other hand if q ≈ 2 160 an attacker using the estimation
with α < (1−2 − ) still has a search space of 2 − max i (s i ) ≈ 2 160− many possible values q satisfying (4) . Now if we assume that the time needed for finding q is about the square root of the size of the search space (i.e. 2 80− /2 ) we can estimate the expected workload of this attack by 2 80− /2 /2 20− = 2 60+ /2 > 2 70 which would be a formidable task. Note that to our knowledge there is no way to use that q is prime if one applies a "square root" algorithm such as Pollard-ρ to determine q.
Security problem of Schnorr-analogue in prime order subgroups of (Z Z/nZ Z) * -Immunity of our scheme
The main practical advantage of our proposed scheme compared to the original one is its very efficient signature generation due to application of CRT for (O ∆1 /pO ∆1 ) * . Thus one may think about a Schnorr-analogue operating in a prime order subgroup of (Z Z/nZ Z) * rather than IF * p , which would allow the same speedup by using CRT for (Z Z/nZ Z) * in this case.
However we will briefly show in the following that, in contrary to our scheme, the breaking of such an analogue in (Z Z/nZ Z) * , is surprisingly easy. 
Now there are two different cases to consider:
Because g is of order q in (Z Z/nZ Z) * (and by (5) also in IF * p1 ), we have g ≡ 1 (mod p 1 ). But g q ≡ 1 (mod p 2 ) together with q |(p 2 − 1) and the primeness of q implies that g ≡ 1 (mod p 2 ) and hence g − 1 = p 2 k for some integer k. Thus n is easily factored by computing p 2 = gcd(g − 1, n). Note that in this case one does not even need to know q and this case is very likely if p 2 is chosen randomly. 2. q|(p 2 − 1):
In this case the scheme is similar to [5] and as shown in [14] is not immediately broken, but factoring n is made much easier, if one knows q. ) steps. Thus if p 1 , p 2 , q are the same order of magnitude this is a trivial task. Hence one must take great care, when working with subgroups of (Z Z/nZ Z) * .
The situation for our proposed scheme in Ker(φ
is entirely different, because there is no gcd-analogue known for imaginary quadratic class groups, which could be applied to mount an "attack" like explained in the first situation above. Note that the existence of such a gcd-analogue would also imply the insecurity of NICE. The situation that q|h(∆ 1 ), which corresponds to the second situation above, is very unlikely if q, ∆ 1 are chosen at random.
More Efficient Exponentiation Using CRT in (O ¡1 /pO ¡1 ) £ and Timings
In Section 2 and [9] we saw that the arithmetic in Ker(φ
−1
Cl ) can be reduced to arithmetic in (O ∆1 /pO ∆1 ) * , which is much more efficient. In this section we will introduce a method which again speeds up the signing process considerably. . ✷ With this result we immediately obtain the of the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4 (Gen-CRT)
Input: α = x + yω ∈ O ∆1 , the conductor p, such that gcd(N (α), p) = 1, ∆1 p = 1, the roots ρ,ρ ∈ IF * p of f (X) as given in (6) and the exponent n ∈ Z Z. Output: a = (a, b) = ρ p (ϕ((αO ∆1 ) n )). These timings show that the signature generation of our proposed scheme using the novel CRT variant for exponentiation is more than twice as fast as the original scheme. While the signature verification is much less efficient than in the original scheme, this should be no problem, as the verification is usually not performed in a device with limited computational power, such as a smartcard.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a new signature scheme based on non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders, which features very fast signature generation. The security analysis shows that using standard assumptions the forging of signatures is equivalent to factoring ∆ p = ∆ 1 p 2 . Thus beside further studying implementation issues of cryptosystems based on non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders it will be an important task for the future to consider the factorization problem for this type of non-fundamental discriminant more closely.
